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AUSTIN DERAMO

Manufactured Mootness: How the Supreme Court’s
Decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol
Association Highlights the Need for Congress to
Define the Term “Prevailing Party”
ABSTRACT
The constitutional limits of state and local firearm regulation became an
inevitable contest following the Supreme Court’s recognition of an
individual’s right to keep and bear arms in District of Columbia v. Heller.
After granting certiorari in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. City
of New York (NYSR&PA), the Supreme Court was prepared to weigh in on
the contest by examining the constitutionality of a local New York City gun
regulation. However, after two post certiorari changes to New York law, New
York City’s brief strove to have the case dismissed as moot. A controversial
amicus brief went even further, asserting that if the Court did not dismiss the
case as moot, the decision would justify congressional efforts to restructure
the Court. Consequently, the Court shifted its focus onto the jurisdictional
bar of mootness. And, as a result, the central issue in NYSR&PA was no
longer whether New York City’s ban on transporting a licensed, locked, and
unloaded handgun to a home or shooting range outside city limits was
consistent with the Second Amendment, but whether the first Second
Amendment case to reach the Supreme Court in over a decade was
justiciable.
Ultimately, the Court held that the petitioners’ appeal in NYSR&PA no
longer presented a justiciable case or controversy and, therefore, dismissed
the appeal on grounds of mootness. Specifically, the Court reasoned that the
two post certiorari changes in law effectively awarded the petitioners the
precise relief requested—to transport firearms to a second home or shooting
range outside the city—therefore, the petitioners’ claim for declaratory and
injunctive relief no longer presented a justiciable case or controversy. While
there remains an intriguing scholarly debate over whether the two post
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certiorari changes in law in NYSR&PA truly rendered the petitioners’ appeal
moot, this Note does not weigh in on that debate. Rather, this Note focuses
on: (1) a government defendant’s incentive to manufacture mootness, and
(2) the current contradiction under Supreme Court precedent, which
considers the petitioners in NYSR&PA as receiving the precise relief
requested but does not consider the petitioners to be a prevailing party
entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988—a critical civil rights
enforcement statute.

AUTHOR
J.D. Candidate, Liberty University School of Law (2022); B.S.
Government: Politics & Policy, Liberty University (2019).
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NOTE
MANUFACTURED MOOTNESS: HOW THE SUPREME COURT’S
DECISION IN NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION
HIGHLIGHTS THE NEED FOR CONGRESS TO DEFINE THE TERM
“PREVAILING PARTY”
Austin Deramo†
I. INTRODUCTION
The practice of awarding reasonable attorney’s fees1 to the “prevailing
party” of a lawsuit is colloquially known as fee-shifting.2 In the English legal
system, the prevailing party of a lawsuit is generally entitled to fee-shifting by
collecting his attorney’s fees from his unsuccessful opponent.3 This practice
has become known as the “English Rule.”4 In the American legal system, the
prevailing party of a lawsuit must generally pay his own attorney’s fees absent
a statutory authorization or a contractual basis.5 This practice has become
known as the “American Rule.”6
Historically, Congress authorized statutory fee-shifting as a particularly
appropriate remedy in civil rights legislation.7 In fact, every major civil rights
†

J.D. Candidate, Liberty University School of Law (2022); B.S. Government: Politics &
Policy, Liberty University (2019).
1
Articles dealing with attorney’s fees must first decide as “a matter of style and usage
[whether to] refer to ‘attorney fees,’ ‘attorneys fees,’ ‘attorney’s fees,’ or ‘attorneys’ fees?’”
Stallworth v. Greater Cleveland Reg’l Transit Auth., 105 F.3d 252, 253 n.1 (6th Cir. 1997).
Judge Danny Boggs, writing for the Sixth Circuit, observed that “[i]n federal statutes, rules
and cases, we find these forms used interchangeably, nay, promiscuously.” Id. However,
because the Supreme Court Style Manual expressly advises opinion writers to use the phrase
“attorney’s fees;” and in light of the use of “attorney’s fees” in the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, “attorney’s fees” will be used throughout this Note.
2
Maureen S. Carroll, Fee-Shifting Statutes and Compensation for Risk, 95 IND. L.J. 1021,
1022 (2020).
3
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 & n.18 (1975); John F.
Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice,
42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1993).
4
Vargo, supra note 3, at 1569.
5
Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 257; Vargo, supra note 3, at 1567, 1569, 1578, 1587.
6
Vargo, supra note 3, at 1569.
7
S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 3 (1976) (noting that the very first fee-shifting statute, the
Enforcement Act of 1870, was a civil rights statute that provided for attorney’s fees in three
separate provisions protecting voting rights); see Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390
U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam).
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statute that passed through Congress since 1964 included, or has been
amended to include, one or more fee-shifting provisions.8 Generally,
Congress enacts statutory fee-shifting provisions to encourage the
enforcement of laws deemed to promote the public interest.9 In addition,
members of Congress have argued that not authorizing fee-shifting as a
remedy in a civil rights statute would be a legislative omission tantamount to
repealing the statute itself because not awarding fee-shifting would frustrate
the very purpose of the civil rights statute, which is to promote the
enforcement of civil rights.10
Despite Congress’s historical reliance on the efficacy of statutory feeshifting provisions to promote the enforcement of civil rights, the Supreme
Court rendered a decision in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West
Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources11 that dramatically
altered the utility of many fee-shifting provisions in civil rights statutes
enacted by Congress. Stated generally, the issue in Buckhannon was whether
the plaintiff properly qualified as a “prevailing party,” and was therefore
entitled to attorney’s fees under the fee-shifting provisions of two major civil
rights statutes.12 Stated more specifically, the issue in Buckhannon was
whether the institutional plaintiff, who achieved the desired results of its
lawsuit because the government defendant voluntarily ceased to engage in
the conduct challenged by the plaintiff, qualified as a “prevailing party.”13 As
a result of the issue presented in Buckhannon, the Court was required to
interpret the phrase “prevailing party,” a phrase commonly used in the
statutory fee-shifting provisions of civil rights statutes.
At the time the Court granted certiorari in Buckhannon, nearly every
federal circuit court in the nation adopted the catalyst theory when
interpreting the phrase “prevailing party.”14 Generally, the catalyst theory
qualified a plaintiff as a “prevailing party,” when that plaintiff achieved the
8

Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 205
(2003) (“Every significant contemporary civil rights statute contains some provision for
attorney’s fees . . . .”); see, e.g., Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(p);
Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617; Equal Employment Amendments of
1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b).
9
Carroll, supra note 2, at 1022.
10
S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 2 (1976); see Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 13 (1973).
11
Buckhannon Bd & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S.
598 (2001).
12
Id. at 600.
13
Id. at 603.
14
SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION
1983 (4th ed. 2015).
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desired results of its lawsuit because the defendant voluntarily ceased to
engage in the conduct challenged by the plaintiff.15 Despite this widespread
circuit court precedent, the Court in Buckhannon expressly rejected the
catalyst theory.16 Specifically, the Court held that a defendant’s voluntary
cessation of the challenged conduct alone, is not sufficient to qualify a
plaintiff as a prevailing party; but rather, to qualify as a prevailing party, the
plaintiff must obtain a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the
parties,” such as a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent
decree.17 Notably, the Court acknowledged the fear that, without the catalyst
theory and the accompanying threat of fee-shifting, defendants would be
incentivized to manufacture mootness or strategically capitulate just enough
to collectively thwart an unfavorable judgment and avoid paying attorney’s
fees to civil rights litigants.18 However, the Court reasoned that removing the
catalyst theory did not pose a serious risk of manufactured mootness because
a plaintiff could assert that the defendant’s voluntary change in conduct did
not render her case moot by reason of the voluntary cessation doctrine, which
is an exception to mootness.19
In the years following Buckhannon, modern data has called into question
the Court’s assumption that, without the catalyst theory, the voluntary
cessation doctrine would suffice as a deterrent to manufactured mootness.20
First, modern data since Buckhannon establishes that the voluntary cessation
doctrine is not applied in a consistent manner, which has diminished the
doctrine’s ability to deter manufactured mootness.21 Second, modern data
establishes that, when the voluntary cessation doctrine is applied to
government defendants, the doctrine is severely stripped of its utility because
courts often defer to a government defendant’s claim of sincerity.22 Finally,
research has established that civil rights plaintiffs often seek nonmonetary

15

See infra Section II.A.
Buckannon, 532 U.S. at 604.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 608.
19
Id. at 608–09.
20
See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights:
The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087
(2007) (presenting empirical evidence that Buckhannon increased occurrences of “strategic
capitulation,” i.e., manufactured mootness).
21
Joseph C. Davis & Nicholas R. Reaves, Note, The Point Isn’t Moot: How Lower Courts
Have Blessed Government Abuse of the Voluntary-Cessation Doctrine, 129 YALE L.J. 325, 325
(2019).
22
Id.
16
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relief, such as institutional reform or a change in policy.23 Therefore, the
prospect of being awarded attorney’s fees under the fee-shifting provisions of
civil rights statutes incentivizes attorneys to bring civil rights cases on behalf
of indigent plaintiffs.24 However, without the catalyst theory, a civil rights
plaintiff may “receive the precise relief [they] requested,” yet fail to qualify as
a prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988—a critical
civil rights statute.25 As a result, the Court’s decision in Buckhannon not only
altered the ability for civil rights litigants to bring successful claims against a
government defendant, but has the potential to produce a chilling effect on
civil rights litigation by placing a formidable barrier to an award of attorney’s
fees.26
In light of these developments, critics urge the Court to reverse
Buckhannon; however, considering the unlikely event that the Court would
grant certiorari on a case to overturn Buckhannon, combined with the force
of statutory stare decisis27 and widespread reliance28 on Buckhannon,
judicially overturning Buckhannon is highly unlikely. However, this Note
explains why a congressional response to Buckhannon is a hopeful
alternative. Specifically, Part II of this Note addresses the development of the
catalyst theory and the Court’s decisions to dissolve the theory in
Buckhannon. Part III of this Note addresses the voluntary cessation
doctrine’s inability to fill the void created by the Court’s decision to dissolve
the catalyst theory. Finally, Part IV proposes a shift in focus from the Court
to Congress by proposing a new statute defining the phrase prevailing party
in statutory fee-shifting provisions.
II. BACKGROUND
Despite the general American Rule, and outside of express congressional
authorization to engage in fee-shifting, federal courts historically relied upon
their broad equitable powers to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the

23

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 3 (1976) (noting that the prototypical case arising under a
civil rights statute involves an indigent plaintiff with no damage claims from which an
attorney could draw its fee). Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597 (2006) (“Since some
civil-rights violations would yield damages too small to justify the expenses of litigation,
Congress has authorized attorney’s fees for civil-rights plaintiffs.”).
24
See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 20, at 1088.
25
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1539 (2020).
26
See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 20, at 1087 (presenting empirical evidence that
Buckhannon increased occurrences of “strategic capitulation”).
27
See infra Section IV.A.
28
See infra Section IV.A.
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prevailing party of a lawsuit when “the interests of justice so required.”29 To
that end, federal courts often concluded that the interests of justice required
fee-shifting when a plaintiff, who filed a successful lawsuit, acted as a “‘private
attorney general,’ vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the
highest priority.”30 This practice of equitable fee-shifting later became known
as the “private attorney general doctrine” because it encouraged the private
enforcement of public rights, as opposed to the public enforcement of public
rights by the Attorney General.31
For years, the private attorney general doctrine served as a widely used and
prudential exception to the general American Rule.32 However, in 1975, the
Court’s decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society brought
the practice of fee-shifting under the private attorney general doctrine to an
abrupt end.33 In Alyeska Pipeline, the Court noted that it was “inappropriate
for the Judiciary, without legislative guidance, to reallocate the burdens of
litigation.”34 While the Court recognized several exceptions to the general
American Rule, which would confer upon judges the power to shift fees,35 the
Court’s decision explicitly limited the federal judiciary’s power to enforce the
private attorney general doctrine.36 As a result, federal courts could no longer
invoke their equitable powers to award reasonable attorney’s fees to litigants
under the theory that the litigant vindicated a policy that Congress
considered of the highest priority—absent express congressional
authorization.37

29

Wilderness Soc’y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Id. (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam))
(collecting cases).
31
See generally William B. Rubenstein, On What A “Private Attorney General” Is—And
Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2153 (2004).
32
See Carroll, supra note 2, at 1022; Carl Cheng, Important Rights and the Private
Attorney General Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1929, 1929 (1985).
33
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975).
34
Id. at 247.
35
See id. at 257–63 (affirming exceptions in four instances: (1) when allowed by statute; (2)
when a losing party willfully disobeys a court order; (3) when a losing party acts in bad faith;
and (4) when the “historic power of equity” would allow the recovery of attorney’s fees).
36
Id. at 263 (“[C]ongressional use of the private attorney general concept,] can in no sense
be construed as a grant of authority to the Judiciary to jettison the traditional rule against
nonstatutory allowances to the prevailing party and to award attorneys’ fees whenever the
courts deem the public policy furthered by a particular statute important enough to warrant
the award.”).
37
Id. at 271.
30
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In response to the Alyeska Pipeline decision, Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 197638 (Fees Award Act), which
significantly amended 42 U.S.C. § 1988.39 Notably, the Fees Award Act
expressly authorized federal courts to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing
party in any action or proceeding to enforce a number of civil rights laws.40
In addition, the Fees Award Act stated that its purpose was to restore the
federal courts’ authority to provide attorney’s fees to private citizens who
relied on those courts to vindicate their civil rights.41 Finally, if it was not
explicit enough that the Fees Award Act was a direct response to the Court’s
Alyeska Pipeline decision, Congress noted that the Fees Award Act would
mend the “anomalous gaps” in civil rights law whereby awards of fees,
“according to Alyeska, [were] suddenly unavailable in the most fundamental
civil rights cases.”42
Although the Fees Awards Act simply provided the prospect of attorney’s
fees in civil rights litigation, this congressional response to the Court’s
Alyeska Pipeline decision proved to be an integral part of Congress’s overall
civil rights enforcement scheme. Indeed, the congressional reports on the
Fees Award Act illustrate that civil rights laws vindicate public policies “of
the highest priority,”43 yet “depend heavily on private enforcement.”44
However, the prototypical case arising under a civil rights statute involves an
indigent plaintiff with no damage claims from which an attorney could draw
its fee.45 Thus, to enable citizens to vindicate their rights under various civil
rights laws, they must have the opportunity to recover the cost of
vindication.46 Indeed, the congressional reports illustrate an overarching
effort to ensure that indigent civil rights plaintiffs have “effective access” to
federal courts to enforce civil rights laws, which makes fee-shifting “an
integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain . . . compliance” with civil

38

Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2461 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2003)).
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
40
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1976) (“In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
[numerous civil rights laws], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .”).
41
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 3 (1976).
42
S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 4 (1976).
43
Id. at 3 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per
curiam)).
44
Id. at 2.
45
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 3 (1976).
46
Id.
39
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rights laws.47 However, after the Fees Award Act re-leveled the playing field,
courts were then tasked with interpreting the newly amended “prevailing
party” provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
A.

Prevailing Under the Catalyst Theory

When courts began to interpret the phrase “prevailing party” in 42
U.S.C. § 1988, it appeared to be a relatively evident conclusion that a plaintiff
was the prevailing party of a lawsuit if she secured a favorable ruling on the
merits of her lawsuit. However, a more difficult issue of statutory
interpretation arose when courts began considering whether a plaintiff was a
prevailing party of a lawsuit absent a formal ruling on the merits of a lawsuit.
For example, courts now had to consider whether, in a prospective relief case,
a plaintiff would be considered the “prevailing party” when the defendant
voluntarily ceased to engage in the challenged conduct after litigation
commenced. Until the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon, the general
rule in nearly every circuit was that a plaintiff could be considered a
“prevailing party” of a lawsuit, and thus entitled to attorney’s fees, even
absent a formal ruling on the merits of a lawsuit.48
The First Circuit’s holding in Nadeau v. Helgemoe presents a clear example
of lower courts interpreting the phrase “prevailing party” in 42 U.S.C. § 1988
to encompass plaintiffs who receive favorable results absent a formal ruling
on the merits of a lawsuit.49 In Nadeau, the First Circuit held that “the
legislative history [of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976]
strongly suggests that a plaintiff who is partially successful in achieving the
relief sought may still receive an award.”50 The court reasoned that the Senate
Report of the Fees Award Act made it abundantly clear that “in general
‘parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights
through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief.’”51 As an
example, the court noted that a plaintiff would prevail “when [the] plaintiff’s
lawsuit acts as a ‘catalyst’ in prompting defendants to take action to meet
[the] plaintiff’s claims,” and that “attorney’s fees are justified despite the lack
of judicial involvement in the result.”52
47

S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 5 (1976); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 1 (1976); Buckhannon Bd. &
Care Home Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 639 (2001) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
48
NAHMOD, supra note 14, § 10.10.
49
See Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978).
50
Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 278; see also Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 625–26 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
51
Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 279.
52
Id.
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This catalyst theory of prevailing party status gained considerable traction
after the First Circuit’s decision in Nadeau. In fact, with the exception of the
Second Circuit, every Circuit Court of Appeals followed the First Circuit’s
holding in Nadeau.53 In each circuit that followed the newly formed catalyst
theory, there were generally three conditions necessary to a party’s
qualification as a prevailing party, however, they all fell short of a favorable
ruling on the merits such as a final judgment or consent decree.54
Despite this long standing tradition in the federal circuit courts, in 1994,
the Fourth Circuit broke ranks and declared that a plaintiff could not be a
“prevailing party” without “an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or
settlement.”55 However, after the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, nine other circuits
reaffirmed their interpretation of prevailing party under the catalyst theory.56
In 2001, the Supreme Court sought to resolve this split among the circuits.57
While the Court did not directly address the propriety of the catalyst
theory before Buckhannon, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Hewitt v. Helms58

53

Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224, 233–35 (2d Cir. 1995); Ross v. Horn, 598 F.2d 1312, 1322
(3d Cir. 1979); DeMier v. Gondles, 676 F.2d 92, 93 (4th Cir. 1982); Hennigan v. Ouachita Par.
Sch. Bd., 749 F.2d 1148, 1151 (5th Cir. 1985); Johnston v. Jago, 691 F.2d 283, 286 (6th Cir.
1982); Harrington v. DeVito, 656 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1981); see Miller v. Staats, 706 F.2d 336,
341 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Ortiz De Arroyo v. Barcelo, 765 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1985) (Nadeau
reaffirmed); Garcia v. Guerra, 744 F.2d 1159, 1162 (5th Cir. 1984); Williams v. Miller, 620 F.2d
199, 202 (8th Cir. 1980); Sablan v. Dep’t of Fin. of Com. of Northern Mariana Islands, 856 F.2d
1317, 1325–27 (9th Cir. 1988); Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 962 (10th Cir. 1986); Fields v.
City of Tarpon Springs, 721 F.2d 318, 321 (11th Cir. 1983).
54
The three conditions that were generally necessary were:
A plaintiff first had to show that the defendant provided ‘some of the
benefit sought’ by the lawsuit. Wheeler v. Towanda Area School Dist., 950
F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 1991). Under most Circuits’ precedents, a plaintiff
had to demonstrate as well that the suit stated a genuine claim, i.e., one
that was at least ‘colorable,’ not ‘frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.’
Grano, 783 F.2d at 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Plaintiff finally had to establish that her suit was a
‘substantial’ or ‘significant’ cause of defendant’s action providing relief.
Williams v. Leatherbury, 672 F.2d 549, 551 (5th Cir. 1982).
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc., v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532
U.S. 598, 627–28 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
55
S-1 by & Through P-1 v. State Bd. of Educ. of North Carolina, 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.
1994) (en banc) (per curiam).
56
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 627.
57
Id. at 602 (“To resolve the disagreement amongst the Courts of Appeals, we granted
certiorari . . . .”).
58
See Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 (1987).
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suggested that the Fourth Circuit’s position would be overruled. In Hewitt,
Justice Scalia famously claimed:
It is settled law, of course, that relief need not be judicially
decreed in order to justify a fee award under § 1988. A
lawsuit sometimes produces voluntary action by the
defendant that affords the plaintiff all or some of the relief
he sought through a judgment—e.g., a monetary settlement
or a change in conduct that redresses the plaintiff's
grievances. When that occurs, the plaintiff is deemed to have
prevailed despite the absence of a formal judgment in his
favor.59
However, fourteen years later, Justice Scalia abandoned this broad approach
and concurred with the strictly formalistic majority in Buckhannon.60
B.

Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of
Health and Human Resources

The Buckhannon decision significantly altered an integral part of the postAlyeska Pipeline civil rights enforcement system. The issue in Buckhannon
was the correct interpretation of the phrase “prevailing party.”61 The plaintiff,
Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc., sought declaratory and injunctive
relief from a West Virginia law that required elderly residents to be capable
of “self-preservation.”62 The law required that all residents of homes like
Buckhannon’s be capable of “self-preservation,” which meant, in part, that
residents could make their way to fire exits without assistance.63 The plaintiffs

59

Id. at 760–61; see also Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980) (“Nothing in the
language of § 1988 conditions the District Court’s power to award fees on full litigation of
the issues or on a judicial determination that the plaintiff’s rights have been violated.”);
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757 (1980) (per curiam) (noting language in legislative
history that “parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate
rights . . . without formally obtaining relief”). But see Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603–04 n.5
(“[The Court explained that the language in Hewitt was merely dictum which] alluded to the
possibility of attorney’s fees where ‘voluntary action by the defendant . . . affords the plaintiff
all or some of the relief . . . sought,’ but [the Court] expressly reserved the question, see
[Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 763].”).
60
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
61
Id. at 600.
62
Id. at 600-01.
63
Id. at 600.
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alleged that the requirement violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of
198864 (FHAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 199065 (ADA).66
After commencing litigation, the plaintiffs were faced with the state
defendants’ sovereign immunity pleas and, as a result, the plaintiffs
“stipulated to the dismissal of their claim for monetary damages.”67 Later, in
response to the defendants’ motion to dispose of the remainder of the case
summarily, the district court determined that the plaintiffs presented triable
claims under the FHAA and the ADA.68 However, less than a month after the
district court held that the plaintiffs presented triable claims, the West
Virginia legislature enacted two bills eliminating the self-preservation
requirement and moved to dismiss the case as moot.69 The district court
found that it was unlikely that the West Virginia legislature would reenact
the self-preservation rule, and agreed that the legislatures repeal of the selfpreservation rule rendered the case moot.70 As a result of the legislature’s
repeal of the self-preservation requirement, the plaintiffs subsequently
moved for an award of attorney’s fees as the “prevailing party” under the feeshifting provisions of the FHAA and the ADA.71 Although the district court
dismissed the case as moot, the plaintiffs assumed, based on long-standing
federal circuit court precedent, that they were entitled to recover attorney’s
fees under the catalyst theory.
Because the plaintiffs brought suit in the Fourth Circuit—the only circuit
at that time to outright reject the catalyst theory72—the district court rejected
the plaintiffs’ catalyst theory claim and denied their motion for attorney’s
fees.73 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit declined to reexamine its interpretation
of prevailing party en banc, and summarily affirmed the judgment of the
district court.74 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and held that even
64

Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (2003).
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2003).
66
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600–01 (majority opinion).
67
Id. at 624 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
68
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
69
Id. at 624–25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
70
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 19 F. Supp.
2d 567, 577 (N.D.W. Va. 1998); see also Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601.
71
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601.
72
NAHMOD, supra note 14, § 10.10 (“[T]he Fourth Circuit stood alone in holding that the
catalyst theory was not a proper basis for an award of fees to a prevailing party; every other
circuit addressing the matter had taken the contrary position.”).
73
Buckhannon, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 577.
74
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 203 F.3d
819 (4th Cir. 2000).
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though the plaintiffs obtained the relief they sought, for purposes of the
FHAA and the ADA, they were not prevailing parties.75
1.

The Majority

The majority, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, relied primarily on Black’s
Law Dictionary to deduce that the “clear meaning” of “prevailing party” was
a party who has been awarded some relief by the adjudicating court.76
Although the lawsuit brought about the desired result by way of voluntary
cessation, there was no alteration in the legal relationship of the parties in the
absence of a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree.77
Therefore, because there was no alteration in the legal relationship of the
parties, the plaintiffs were not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under
the FHAA or the ADA as prevailing parties.78 The Court made clear,
however, that its opinion was not narrowed to the FHAA or the ADA, but
applied to the prevailing party language embedded in various statutes, such
as the newly amended 42 U.S.C. § 1988.79
In dissolving the catalyst theory, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’
argument that the theory was “necessary to prevent defendants from
unilaterally mooting an action before judgment in an effort to avoid an award
of attorney’s fees,”80 and that “the rejection of the ‘catalyst theory’ w[ould]
deter plaintiffs with meritorious but expensive cases from bringing suit,”81

75

Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610.
Id. at 603, 607.
77
Id. at 604.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 603 n.4 (“We have interpreted these fee-shifting provisions consistently, . . . and
so approach the nearly identical provisions at issue here.”); NAHMOD, supra note 14, § 10.10
(“First, although Buckhannon was not a § 1988 case, the FHAA and ADA fees language
interpreted by the Court is virtually identical to that of § 1988, and therefore, as the Court
itself indicated, the catalyst theory is no longer available under § 1988.”); Compare 42
U.S.C. § 12205 (“In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this
Act, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs, and the
United States shall be liable for the foregoing the same as a private individual.”), and 42
U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (“In a civil action under subsection (a), the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs.
The United States shall be liable for such fees and costs to the same extent as a private
person.”), with 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may also allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the
costs . . . .”).
80
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608.
81
Id.
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because it was unsupported by empirical evidence.82 In addition, the Court
reasoned that “the fear of mischievous defendants only materializes in claims
for equitable relief.”83 And that even in a claim for injunctive relief, the
voluntary cessation doctrine would likely stop a defendant’s claim of
mootness from successfully ridding the case, unless it was absolutely clear
that the allegedly unlawful conduct would not recur.84 In addition, the Court
claimed that “[a] request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second
major litigation,”85 which drove the Court to avoid an interpretation of feeshifting statutes that would “spawn[] a second litigation of significant
dimension.”86 Similarly, the Court was wary of litigation surrounding the
catalyst theory because it would require analysis of the defendant’s subjective
motivations in changing its conduct and “likely depend on a highly factbound inquiry.”87
2.

The Dissent

Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissent, emphasized the long-prevailing
federal circuit court precedent, as well as the legislative history behind the
federal fee-shifting statutes. 88 According to Justice Ginsburg, the catalyst
theory was a key component of the fee-shifting statutes that Congress
adopted to advance the enforcement of civil rights. 89 In fact, congressional
records indicated that the catalyst theory was embedded in the provisions
of § 1988.90 Therefore, eliminating the catalyst theory was unjustified by
legislative history.91 Moreover, eliminating the catalyst theory would permit
a defendant to avoid paying fees where the merits of the suit led the defendant
to manufacture mootness, which would impede access to the court for the
less affluent, and reduce the incentive for private suits to enforce civil rights.92
Therefore, eliminating the catalyst theory was an act contrary to Congress’s
82

Id.
Id.
84
Id. at 608–09.
85
Id. at 609 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)).
86
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 609 (quoting Tex. State Tchrs. Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch.
Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791 (1989)).
87
Id. at 609–10 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 28).
88
Id. at 622, 629 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
89
Id. at 623 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
90
Id. at 638 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 5 (“[F]or purposes of
the award of counsel fees, parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate
rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief.”).
91
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 623 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
92
Id. at 622–23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
83
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intent because Congress enacted civil rights statutes to incentivize private
attorneys to bring civil rights cases on behalf of indigent plaintiffs.93
In response to the majority’s assertion that the voluntary cessation
doctrine, as an exception to mootness, mitigated the decision to dissolve the
catalyst theory, the dissent was skeptical of the doctrine preventing
manufactured mootness when the “recurrence of the controversy is under
the defendant’s control.”94 In response to the majority’s wishes to avoid a
request for attorney’s fees resulting in a second major litigation, the dissent
questioned the value of the Court’s fee-shifting ruling, which would drive a
plaintiff prepared to accept adequate relief to litigate on and on in an attempt
to reach a ruling on the merits.95 Moreover, the dissent noted that, under the
catalyst theory, “[p]ersons with limited resources were not impelled to ‘wage
total law’ in order to assure that their counsel fees would be paid.”96
Finally, the dissent claimed that “Congress intends the words in its
enactments to carry ‘their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.’”97
The dissent reasoned that “prevail,” in everyday use, means “gain victory by
virtue of strength or superiority: win mastery: triumph.”98 Under this
definition, the dissent reasoned that there are undoubtedly situations in
which an individual’s goal is to obtain the approval of a judge, and in those
situations, one cannot “prevail” short of a judge’s formal declaration.99
However, where the ultimate goal is not an arbiter’s approval, but a favorable
alteration of actual circumstances, a formal declaration is not essential.100 The
dissent reasoned further that a lawsuit’s ultimate purpose is to achieve actual
relief from an opponent. While a favorable judgment may be instrumental in
gaining that relief, generally, “the judicial decree is not the end but the means.
At the end of the rainbow lies not a judgment, but some action (or cessation
of action) by the defendant . . . .”101 Therefore, “[o]n this common
understanding, if a party reaches the ‘sought-after destination,’ then the party
‘prevails’ regardless of the ‘route taken.’”102 “Western democracies, for
instance, ‘prevailed’ in the Cold War even though the Soviet Union never
93

See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 20, at 1088.
Buckhannon, 532 U.S at 639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
95
Id.
96
Id. at 636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
97
Id. at 633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
98
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
99
Id.
100
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
101
Id. at 634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761
(1987)).
102
Id. (quoting Hennigan v. Ouachita Par. Sch. Bd., 749 F.2d 1148, 1153 (5th Cir. 1985)).
94
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formally surrendered.”103 “Among television viewers, John F. Kennedy
‘prevailed’ in the first debate with Richard M. Nixon during the 1960
Presidential contest, even though moderator Howard K. Smith never
declared a winner.”104 Therefore, the dissent urged that under a fair reading
of the fee-shifting provisions enacted by Congress, “a party ‘prevails’ in ‘a true
and proper sense,’ when she achieves, by instituting litigation, the practical
relief sought in her complaint.”105
III. PROBLEM
There are several issues with the Supreme Court dismantling the catalyst
theory in Buckhannon. First, and foremost, although the statutes at issue in
Buckhannon were specifically the FHA and the ADA, the fees language
interpreted by the Court was virtually identical to that of many other federal
fee-shifting statutes, including 42 U.S.C. § 1988—a vital civil rights
enforcement statute.106 Therefore, as the Court indicated, the catalyst theory
is no longer available under § 1988 post-Buckhannon.107 The second, and
possibly the most detrimental effect, is that it is now possible for a defendant
sued for prospective relief to manufacture mootness by voluntarily ceasing to
engage in any challenged conduct before a likely adverse decision. As a result,
defendants may not only render a plaintiff’s case moot but have the potential
103

Id. at 633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 633–34 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
105
Id. at 634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111
U.S. 379, 388 (1884)).
106
NAHMOD, supra note 14, § 10.10; Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (“In any action or
administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this Act, the court or agency, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs, and the United States shall be liable
for the foregoing the same as a private individual.”), and 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (“In a civil
action under subsection (a), the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs. The United States shall be liable
for such fees and costs to the same extent as a private person.”), with 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)
(“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs . . . .”).
107
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603 n.4 (“We have interpreted these fee-shifting provisions
consistently, . . . and so approach the nearly identical provisions at issue here.”); NAHMOD,
supra note 14, § 10.10. The Second Circuit applied Buckhannon to § 1988 because “it is clear
that the Supreme Court intends the reasoning of [Buckhannon] to apply to § 1988 as well.”
N.Y. State Fed’n of Taxi Drivers, Inc. v. Westchester Cnty. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 272
F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2001). See also Chambers v. Ohio Dep’t. of Hum. Servs., 273 F.3d 690,
693 (6th Cir. 2001), a § 1988 case overruling Johnston v. Jago, 691 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1982),
which adopted the catalyst theory. Bennett v. Yoshina, 259 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 2001)
applied Buckhannon where the Hawaii legislature enacted legislation that gave the plaintiffs
what they sought but there was no “judicial imprimatur.”
104
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to bring important public litigation to frustratingly anticlimactic
conclusions.108
To combat these issues posed by the Court’s holding in Buckhannon, a
plaintiff faced with a defendant who voluntarily ceases challenged conduct is
left only with the possibility of raising the defense of the voluntary cessation
exception to mootness. However, modern data indicates that the voluntary
cessation doctrine is not applied in a consistent manner, which diminishes
the doctrine’s ability to deter manufactured mootness.109 Moreover, modern
data has established that, when the voluntary cessation doctrine is against
government defendants, the doctrine is severely stripped of its utility because
courts often defer a government defendant’s claim of sincerity.110 Therefore,
scholars have indicated that the Court’s decision in Buckhannon, which
leaves the voluntary cessation doctrine as a last defense, “encourages
‘strategic capitulation,’ makes settlement more difficult, and discourages
attorneys from representing civil rights plaintiffs,” which “herald[s] a shift
away from private rights enforcement toward more government power both
to resist rights claims and to control the meaning of civil rights.”111
Finally, research has established that the prototypical case arising under a
civil rights statute involves an indigent plaintiff with no damage claims from
which an attorney could draw its fee.112 While some civil rights plaintiffs may
seek monetary damages that are significant to them, these damages are far
less than the cost of litigating their claims.113 Further, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity has made recovering damages particularly difficult in
civil rights claims against state actors and government defendants.114
Therefore, the prospect of being awarded attorney’s fees under the feeshifting provisions of civil rights statutes is thought to incentivize attorneys
to bring civil rights cases on behalf of indigent plaintiffs.115 However, without
the catalyst theory, a civil rights plaintiff may receive the “precise relief”
requested, yet fail to qualify as a prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988—a critical civil rights statute.116 As a result, the
108

NAHMOD, supra note 14, § 10.10.
Davis & Reaves, supra note 21, at 335.
110
Id. at 334; NAHMOD, supra note 14, § 10.10.
111
See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 20, at 1087.
112
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 3 (1976).
113
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597 (2006) (“Since some civil-rights violations
would yield damages too small to justify the expenses of litigation, Congress has authorized
attorney’s fees for civil-rights plaintiffs.”).
114
See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 20, at 1102–03.
115
Id. at 1090.
116
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526 (2020).
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Court’s decision in Buckhannon has not only altered the ability for civil rights
litigants to bring successful claims against a government defendant, but also
has the potential to produce a chilling effect on civil rights litigation by
placing a formidable barrier to an award of attorney’s fees.117
A.

Why The Post-Buckhannon Shift in Focus From the Catalyst Theory
to the Voluntary Cessation Doctrine Has a Particularly Detrimental
Effect in Civil Rights Litigation

The Court’s decision in Buckhannon has drawn considerable criticism.118
However, with the exception of the OPEN Government Act of 2007,119 which
abrogated the Court’s holding in Buckhannon with respect to Freedom of
Information Act claims,120 Congress has yet to formally and systematically
address the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the phrase prevailing party.121
To be clear; however, not all statutory fee-shifting provisions were undercut
by the Court’s decision in Buckhannon. Rather, federal courts have held that
the catalyst theory still applies to environmental statutes that authorize
attorney’s fees awards “whenever the court determines such award is
appropriate.”122 Federal courts draw this conclusion because the statutory

117

See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 20, at 1124, 1127 (presenting empirical evidence
that Buckhannon increased occurrences of “strategic capitulation”).
118
Id.; Landyn Wm. Rookard, Don’t Let the Facts Get in the Way of the Truth: Revisiting
How Buckhannon and Alyeska Pipeline Messed up the American Rule, 92 IND. L.J. 1247, 1248
(2017).
119
OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 4(a), 121 Stat. 2524 (2007).
120
Id. (abrogating the Buckhannon proscription on the catalyst theory by reimplementing
the theory in the narrow context of Freedom of Information Act claims); see First
Amendment Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 869 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 2017); Brayton v. Off. of
U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 525 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Warren v. Colvin, 744 F.3d
841, 845 (2d Cir. 2014); Havemann v. Colvin, 537 F. App’x 142, 148–49 (4th Cir. 2013);
Batton v. I.R.S., 718 F.3d 522, 526 n.2 (5th Cir. 2013); Cornucopia Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., 560 F.3d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 2009); Zarcon, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 578 F.3d 892, 894 (8th Cir.
2009).
121
See infra Section IV.B.
122
See, e.g., Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies v. Evans, 386 F.3d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 2004)
(allowing recovery of fees under the catalyst theory for an action brought under the
Endangered Species Act of 1973); Loggerhead Turtle v. Cnty. Council of Volusia, 307 F.3d
1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 2002) (allowing recovery of fees under the catalyst theory for an action
brought under the Endangered Species Act of 1973); Sierra Club v. EPA, 322 F.3d 718, 728
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (allowing recovery of fees under the catalyst theory in an action brought
under the Clean Air Act). For a discussion of Buckhannon in the context of environmental
litigation, see Marisa L. Ugalde, The Future of Environmental Citizen Suits After Buckhannon
Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 8
ENVTL. LAW. 589, 597 (2002).
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language differs from the prevailing party provision interpreted in
Buckhannon.123
Despite the exception to the rule for various environmental statutes, the
Court’s decision in Buckhannon has unequivocally removed the catalyst
theory as a potential avenue to an attorney’s fees award under many crucial
civil rights statutes like 42 U.S.C. § 1988.124 Without the catalyst theory,
defendants faced with a strong claim of injunctive relief, backed by the bite
of paying attorney’s fees, are now able to moot a plaintiff’s claim and avoid
paying attorney’s fees, by providing the requested relief before a ruling on the
merits. 125 This litigation maneuver poses a severe risk to civil rights
enforcement by imposing a substantial obstacle to obtaining attorney’s fees.
Indeed, without the prospect of attorney’s fees, many civil rights claims lack
the financial incentives sufficient to interest private attorneys.126 For example,
civil rights plaintiffs often seek nonmonetary relief, such as institutional
reform or a change in policy. While some civil rights plaintiffs may seek
monetary damages that are significant to them, these damages are far less
than the cost of litigating their claims.127 In addition, given the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, damages are frequently unavailable in civil rights claims
against state actors.128 Thus, federal fee-shifting statutes provide the prospect
of attorney’s fees recovery, and therefore create an enforcement mechanism
for the nation’s civil rights laws by incentivizing attorneys to bring civil rights
cases on behalf of indigent plaintiffs. However, without the catalyst theory, a
civil rights plaintiff may receive the “precise relief” requested, yet fail to
qualify as a prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees under 42
U.S.C. § 1988.129 Therefore, the Court’s decision in Buckhannon carries the
potential to produce a chilling effect on civil rights litigation, by placing a
formidable barrier to an award of attorney’s fees.130
As a result of Buckhannon, plaintiff-lawyers seeking attorney’s fees must
invoke certain exceptions to the mootness doctrine to avoid the negative
123

See NAHMOD, supra note 14, § 10.10.
Id.
125
See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 20, at 1124, 1127 (presenting empirical evidence
that Buckhannon increased occurrences of “strategic capitulation”).
126
Id. at 1090.
127
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597 (2006) (“Since some civil-rights violations
would yield damages too small to justify the expense of litigation, Congress has authorized
attorney’s fees for civil-rights plaintiffs.”).
128
See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 20, at 1102.
129
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526 (2020).
130
See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 20, at 1124, 1127 (presenting empirical evidence
that Buckhannon increased occurrences of “strategic capitulation”).
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effects of a defendant’s strategic capitulation.131 Consequently, the debate in
this category of cases, which once centered over the catalyst theory of
prevailing party status, now centers around the voluntary cessation doctrine
and various exceptions to the jurisdictional bar of mootness.132
B.

The Voluntary Cessation Doctrine and Civil Rights Litigation:
Government Defendants

The Buckhannon majority claimed that empirical evidence had yet to show
that strategic capitulation posed a serious risk of manufactured mootness in
light of the voluntary cessation doctrine.133 However, empirical evidence that
has developed since the Buckhannon decision called the Court’s empirical
assumptions into question.134 In fact, modern data indicates that the
voluntary cessation doctrine is not applied in a consistent manner, which has
diminished the doctrine’s ability to deter manufactured mootness.135 In
addition, modern data establishes that, when the voluntary cessation doctrine
is against government defendants, the doctrine is severely stripped of its
utility because courts often defer a government defendant’s claim of
sincerity.136 As a result, modern data undercuts the majority’s assumption in
Buckhannon that strategic capitulation did not pose a serious risk of
manufactured mootness in light of the voluntary cessation doctrine.137
Even worse, the Buckhannon decision may have a more chilling effect on
public interest and civil rights litigation because plaintiffs that seek injunctive
relief against government defendants appear to be the most vulnerable to
strategic capitulation. For example, government defendants often seek to
avoid creating adverse precedent that will preclude desired policy ends. Thus,
even if that means losing a few battles to still win the war, government
defendants will frequently seek to avoid creating an adverse precedent.138 One
131

See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532
U.S. 598, 607–08 (2001); Michael Ashton, Note, Recovering Attorneys’ Fees with the
Voluntary Cessation Exception to Mootness Doctrine after Buckhannon Board and Care
Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 2002 WIS. L. REV.
965, 972 (2002).
132
Ashton, supra note 131, at 981.
133
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608.
134
See id. at 608; Ashton, supra note 131, at 967–68.
135
Davis & Reaves, supra note 21, at 333.
136
Id.
137
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608.
138
See Guzzi v. Thompson, 470 F. Supp. 2d 17, 19–20 (D. Mass. 2007) (discussing that a
prisoner filed a civil-rights action challenging the denial of a kosher diet, however,
Massachusetts succeeded in mooting the case by giving only the plaintiff kosher meals and
avoided the prospect of a systemic change in policy).
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tool in their arsenal is a mid-litigation change in the law specifically designed
to moot a concerning case. Evidence shows that government defendants
employ this tool with some frequency, especially after Buckhannon, because
federal courts have consistently entitled government defendants to a
presumption of good faith139 and special solicitude when reviewing a
government defendant’s strategic capitulation under the voluntary cessation
doctrine.140
For example, under the voluntary cessation doctrine, “a defendant’s
voluntary cessation of a challenged practice” ordinarily “‘does not deprive a
federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice’ unless it is
‘absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be
expected to recur.’”141 While the Supreme Court described this standard as a
“heavy burden” placed onto the party asserting mootness,142 when the
defendant has been a government entity whose voluntary cessation consists
of changing a challenged law or policy, some lower federal courts have
required the plaintiff to show that it is “virtually certain” that the old law or
policy “will be reenacted.”143 As voluntary cessation precedent shows, civil
rights litigants who bring suit against government defendants are forced to
undertake an unpredictable debate of mootness, which costs plaintiffs a
substantial amount of attorney’s fees, therefore acting as an ever-larger
financial disincentive to litigating important but expensive civil rights claims.
As a result, when the voluntary cessation doctrine is applied against
government defendants, the doctrine is severely stripped of its utility, and a
recent example of this is New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. City of
New York.

139

Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2009); Amawi v.
Paxton, 956 F.3d 816, 821 (5th Cir. 2020); Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen, 968 F.3d 628, 646 (7th
Cir. 2020); Texas v. Azar, 476 F. Supp. 3d 570, 575 (S.D. Tex. 2020).
140
Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 20, at 1112 n.140 (collecting cases); see, e.g., Steven B.
Dow, Navigating Through the Problem of Mootness in Corrections Litigation, 43 CAP. U. L.
REV. 651, 675 & n.238–46 (2015) (collecting cases); Ashton, supra note 131, at 969 (“[T]he
voluntary cessation exception most likely will not be applied to government
defendants . . . .”). Davis & Reaves, supra note 21, at 333.
141
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 609 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)); see also City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle,
Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982).
142
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 719 (2007).
143
Teague v. Cooper, 720 F.3d 973, 977 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Native Vill. of Noatak v.
Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1510 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. City of New York

Following Heller,144 the Court had not addressed a major gun rights case
for almost ten years; however, the Court was prepared to address a restrictive
gun regulation in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. City of New
York145 (NYSR&PA). Before reaching the Supreme Court, lower courts
examined the former version of the gun regulation at the center of
NYSR&PA.146 The former version heavily restricted licensed gun owners
from transporting their licensed handguns throughout the City of New York
(City) for the purpose of taking them to shooting ranges or shooting
competitions outside of the City’s limits.147 In addition, the former version
did not include any provision allowing licensed holders to transport licensed
handguns to a second home outside of the City’s limits.148 Due to these
restrictions, three individuals, along with the New York State Rifle & Pistol
Association (Petitioners), brought suit against the City and the New York
Police Department License Division (NYPD).149 The Petitioners collectively
sought an injunction against the enforcement of the statute, along with a
request for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.150 However, the City
vigorously defended the constitutionality of this ordinance through five years
of litigation, winning in both the Southern District of New York151 and the
Second Circuit152 on all substantive grounds.
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review New York State Rifle
& Pistol Ass’n,153 the Court set out to determine specifically “[w]hether the
City’s ban on transporting a licensed, locked, and unloaded handgun to a
home or shooting range outside city limits [wa]s consistent with the Second

144

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020).
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See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 86 F. Supp. 3d 249, 268
(S.D.N.Y. 2015); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45, 68 (2d Cir.
2018).
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Brief of Respondents at 22–23, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140
S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (No. 18-280).
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Id.
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See generally Amended Complaint at 1, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New
York, 86 F. Supp. 3d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13 Civ. 2115).
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See generally id. at 19.
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(S.D.N.Y. 2015).
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See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45, 68 (2d Cir. 2018).
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cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 939 (2019).
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Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the constitutional right to travel.”154
However, after granting certiorari, the Court shifted its focus onto the
jurisdictional bar of mootness stemming from two post certiorari changes in
the law.155 In fact, a controversial amicus brief asserted that if the Court did
not dismiss the case as moot, that decision would justify congressional efforts
to restructure the Court.156 Consequently, the central issue in NYSR&PA was
no longer whether New York City’s ban on transporting a licensed, locked,
and unloaded handgun to a home or shooting range outside city limits was
consistent with the Second Amendment. Instead, the Court was forced to
consider whether the first major Second Amendment case to reach the
Supreme Court in over a decade was justiciable.157
Scholars have indicated that the City’s efforts to moot the case were not
the product of a change of heart, but rather of a carefully calculated effort to
frustrate the Court’s review.158 The City never admitted that it changed its
regulation because of any newfound recognition that the old rule was wrong
or unlawful rather, the City continued to defend the old ordinance on the
merits.159 Nonetheless, the City urged the Court to find the case moot due to
its post-certiorari changes in law and the supposed presumption that a
government defendants’ mid-litigation changes to the law were undertaken
in good faith and intended to be permanent.160 The City further argued that
154
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York,
140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (No. 18-280).
155
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526 (2020)
(“After we granted certiorari, the State of New York amended its firearm licensing statute,
and the City amended the rule so that petitioners may now transport firearms to a second
home or shooting range outside of the city.”). See generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(6)
(Consol. 2022); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 38, § 5-23(a)(3) (2022).
156
See Brief of Senators Sheldon Whitehouse et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 17, 23, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525
(2020) (No. 18-280) (asserting that if the Court did not dismiss the case as moot, it would
reveal itself as merely a tool of “the big funders, corporate influencers, and political base of
the Republican Party” and justify congressional efforts to “restructure” the Court).
157
The last major Second Amendment case to reach the Supreme Court, prior to
NYSR&PA, was decided by the Court in 2010. See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742
(2010). The Court’s per curium opinion in NYSR&PA, the first major Second Amendment
case to reach the Court after McDonald, focused solely on whether the petitioners’ claim was
moot. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526 (2020).
158
Davis & Reaves, supra note 21, at 327–28 n.16.
159
See Brief of Respondents, supra note 147, at 7 (defending what the City now calls the
“former rule” on all substantive grounds).
160
Response to Suggestion of Mootness at 17–20, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of
New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (No. 18-280). See also Brief of Senators Sheldon
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the “Court has long treated a governmental defendant’s change in law as
falling beyond the reach of the voluntary cessation doctrine.”161 And that “‘[a]ll
the circuits to address the issue’ also have agreed that a change in law ‘moots
a plaintiff's injunction request’ because governmental entities are presumed
to make such changes without any intent to revert to prior law.”162 In
response, scholars pointed the Court to the voluntary cessation doctrine as
an exception to mootness,163 and urged the Court to reaffirm the doctrine’s
important procedural protection; however, the Court’s opinion wholly
dodged the doctrine’s application.164
IV. SOLUTION
The solution to the inability of the voluntary cessation doctrine deterring
a government defendant’s strategic capitulation, is reimplementing the
catalyst theory. Without the catalyst theory, there is little to no financial risk
of paying attorney’s fees—a penalty that deters litigants from engaging in
strategic capitulation. As a result, potentially important public litigation may
come to frustratingly anticlimactic conclusions as evinced in NYSR&PA.
Alternatively, under the catalyst theory a defendant is deterred from strategic
capitulation by the prospect of paying attorney’s fees despite engaging in a
voluntary and potentially unnecessary change in conduct. Scholars have
called the Supreme Court to reimplement the catalyst theory by overruling,
or reexamining Buckhannon.165 However, the “special force” attached to
statutory stare decisis combined with widespread reliance on Buckhannon
makes reversal highly unlikely.166 Congressional response to Buckhannon,
Whitehouse et al., supra note 156, at 17, 23 (asserting that if the Court did not dismiss the
case as moot, it would reveal itself as merely a tool of “the big funders, corporate influencers,
and political base of the Republican Party” and justify congressional efforts to “restructure”
the Court).
161
Suggestion of Mootness at 24, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140
S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (No. 18-280) (emphasis added).
162
Id.
163
See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 & n.10 (1982); Ne. Fla.
Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 661–62
(1993).
164
Davis & Reaves, supra note 21, at 325.
165
Id.
166
In a case involving a suit by a prisoner and his fiancé alleging a violation of their
constitutional right to marry, the Sixth Circuit applied Buckhannon retroactively to the case
before it and held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney’s fees. Toms v. Taft, 338
F.3d 519, 528–30 (6th Cir. 2003). They obtained only a voluntary change in defendants’
conduct but not a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree. See id. In
another case, the plaintiff sued a state highway patrolman, among others, alleging violations
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however, is a hopeful alternative that would potentially reimplement the
catalyst theory. Instead of forcing prospective civil rights plaintiffs to fight a
taxing and unpredictable battle of mootness, without the deterrent of the
catalyst theory, a new statute defining prevailing party would deter strategic
capitulation, circumvent the unpredictable mootness debate, and altogether
promote civil rights enforcement.
A.

The “Special Force” of Statutory Stare Decisis

Due to the “special force” attached to statutory stare decisis, a solution to
the overall issue of strategic capitulation, post-Buckhannon, will more than
likely need to derive from congressional action rather than judicial
reinterpretation. While the Court is relatively willing to overrule
constitutional precedent, because in that context the Court considers
“correction through legislative action [as] practically impossible,”167 several
Justices on the Court have given cases “interpreting statutes special
protection from overruling.”168 Rather, in the context of statutory precedent,
the Supreme Court insists that a party advocating the abandonment of a
statutory interpretation bears a greater burden.169 The Court claims that stare
decisis has “special force” in statutory precedent,170 which it gains “from the
principle of legislative supremacy—the belief that Congress, rather than the
Supreme Court, bears primary responsibility for shaping policy through
statutory law.”171
The Supreme Court’s cases and the literature discussing the “special force”
of statutory stare decisis offer two explanations for the Supreme Court’s
statutory stare decisis practice. One explanation for the Court’s special force
behind statutory stare decisis is that the doctrine reflects deference to
Congress’s wishes.172 This deference typically occurs through an
of her constitutional rights in connection with an investigation of alleged child neglect by the
plaintiff. Coates v. Powell, 639 F.3d 471, 474–75 (8th Cir. 2011). The plaintiff entered into a
private settlement with the patrolman and then sought attorney’s fees, which the district
court denied on the ground that she was not a prevailing party under Buckhannon. Id.
Affirming, the Eighth Circuit observed that the district court had taken no action that
judicially sanctioned or materially altered the relationship of the parties. See id. at 474–75.
167
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
168
Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 317 (2005).
169
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (“[T]he burden borne by
the party advocating abandonment of an established precedent is greater where the Court is
asked to overrule a point of statutory construction.”).
170
Id.
171
Barrett, supra note 168, at 317.
172
Id.
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interpretation of congressional silence following the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of a statute as acquiesence or approval of the Court’s
interpretation.173 The argument is, “[i]f Congress had disagreed with the
Supreme Court’s interpretation . . . Congress would have amended the
statute to reflect its disagreement. By failing to amend the statute, Congress
signals its acquiescence in the Supreme Court’s approach.”174 A second
explanation for the heightened stare decisis in statutory cases is a means of
honoring legislative supremacy, or the separation of powers.175 The argument
is, “in our Constitution’s separation of powers, policymaking is an aspect of
legislative, rather than judicial, power. Because statutory interpretation
inevitably involves policymaking, it risks infringing upon legislative power,
and consequently, the Supreme Court should approach the task with
caution.”176 While the Court cannot avoid interpreting a statute the first time
a statutory ambiguity is presented to the Court, “the Supreme Court’s refusal
to revisit a statutory interpretation is a means of shifting policymaking
responsibility back to Congress, where it belongs.”177
Here, both explanations for a heightened stare decisis apply to the Court’s
precedent in Buckhannon, and therefore effectively requires congressional
action rather than judicial reinterpretation. In fact, outside of the OPEN
Government Act of 2007,178 the Court’s 2001 interpretation of the phrase
“prevailing party” in the Fair Housing Act179 and the Americans with

173

See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 792 (1998); Burlington Indus. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763–64 (1998); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 700–01 (1992);
Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991); United States v. Johnson, 481
U.S. 681, 686–87 n.6 (1987); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987); Square
D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 421–24 (1986); S. Motor Carriers
Rate Conf., Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 55 n.18 (1985); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,
281–84 (1972); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488–89 n. 7 (1940). See generally
John Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into
“Speculative Unrealities,” 64 B.U. L. REV. 737, 741–54 (1985); Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a
Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressional and Constitutional Silence, 57
IND. L.J. 515 (1982).
174
Barrett, supra note 168, at 317.
175
See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295–96 (1996); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union, 398 U.S. 235, 255–61 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); Francis v. S. Pac. Co., 333 U.S.
445, 450 (1948); Douglass v. Cnty. of Pike, 101 U.S. 677, 687 (1880).
176
Barrett, supra note 168, at 317.
177
Id.
178
OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 4(a), 121 Stat. 2524 (2007).
179
42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .”).
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Disabilities Act180 has not been addressed directly by Congress. This long
period of congressional silence confirms the “special force” of statutory stare
decisis surrounding the Court’s decision in Buckhannon. Moreover, an
argument for honoring legislative supremacy would direct the Court to avoid
revisiting and reinterpreting the phrase “prevailing party” as a means of
shifting the policymaking responsibility back to Congress, “where it
belongs.”181 As a result, statutory stare decisis effectively requires
congressional action rather than judicial reinterpretation.
B.

Congress Reestablishing the Catalyst Theory

Congressional response to reimplement the pre-Buckhannon catalyst
theory is a relatively easy task. In First Amendment Coalition v. United States
DOJ,182 the Ninth Circuit joined several other Circuit Courts of Appeals in
determining that the OPEN Government Act of 2007183 reinstated the preBuckhannon catalyst theory of recovery with regards to Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) claims.184 Prior to the 2007 amendment, the FOIA,
specifically Section 552(a)(4)(E) of Title 5 of the United States Code, stated
that “the court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees
and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section
in which the complainant has substantially prevailed.”185 The 2007
amendment added the following: “(ii) For purposes of this subparagraph, a
complainant has substantially prevailed if the complainant has obtained relief
through either[:]” (1) “a judicial order, or an enforceable written agreement
or consent decree; or” (2) “a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the
agency, if the complainant’s claim is not insubstantial.”186
While many lower federal courts have interpreted the 2007 Amendment
to the FOIA as reimplementing the pre-Buckhannon catalyst theory, the
Amendment still only reaches as far as FOIA claims. Outside of the OPEN

180
42 U.S.C. § 12205 (“[T]he court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses . . . .”).
181
Barrett, supra note 168, at 317.
182
See First Amendment Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 869 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2017).
183
OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 4(a), 121 Stat. 2524 (2007).
184
The Ninth Circuit joined the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and the D.C.
Circuits. See Brayton v. Off. of U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
Warren v. Colvin, 744 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 2014); Havemann v. Colvin, 537 F. App’x 142 (4th
Cir. 2013); Batton v. I.R.S., 718 F.3d 522 (5th Cir. 2013); Cornucopia Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., 560 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2009); Zarcon, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 578 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 2009).
185
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E).
186
Id.
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Government Act of 2007,187 Congress has not systematically and formally
addressed the Court’s overall interpretation of a prevailing party in
Buckhannon, which has not been cabined in to the statutory provisions at
issue in Buckhannon.188 To be clear, however, not all statutory fee-shifting
provisions have been undercut by the Court’s proscription in Buckhannon.
Rather, federal courts have held that the catalyst theory still applies to
environmental statutes that authorize attorney’s fees awards “whenever the
court determines such award is appropriate.”189 Federal courts have drawn
this conclusion because the statutory language differs from the prevailing
party provision interpreted in Buckhannon.190
The common factor between each maneuver around the Court’s
proscription in Buckhannon is a distinction in statutory language, or an
amendment to an existing fee-shifting provision by Congress. Considering
the special force of statutory stare decisis, and the principle of legislative
supremacy—the belief that Congress, rather than the Supreme Court, bears
primary responsibility for shaping policy through statutory law—it is not
surprising that the Court has refrained from reshaping the interpretation of
federal fee-shifting statutes laid out in Buckhannon, but have accepted a
reinterpretation prompted by a congressional amendment. This Note
therefore proposes congressional action to reach a preferred judicial
reinterpretation of the term prevailing party as used in federal fee-shifting
statutes.
187

See OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 4(a), 121 Stat. 2524 (2007).
Scholars have noted that the Court’s decision in Buckhannon applies to nearly every
federal fee-shifting statute. Richard L. Gibson, Redefining the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees
Award Act: Buckhannon Board and Care Homes and the End of the Catalyst Theory, 52
CATH. U. L. REV. 207 (2003). Senator Russ Feingold has twice proposed legislation to change
the definition of “prevailing party” in all federal legislation, but both bills died in committee.
See Settlement Encouragement and Fairness Act, S. 3161, 107th Cong. (2002) (died in the
judiciary committee); Settlement Encouragement and Fairness Act, S. 1117, 108th Cong.
(2003) (incorporating into the Civil Rights Act of 2004, S. 2088, 108th Cong. (2004), which
died in the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions).
189
See, e.g., Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies v. Evans, 386 F.3d 879, 881 (9th Cir. 2004)
(allowing recovery of fees under the catalyst theory for an action brought under the
Endangered Species Act of 1973); Loggerhead Turtle v. Cnty. Council of Volusia, 307 F.3d
1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 2002) (allowing recovery of fees under the catalyst theory for an action
brought under the Endangered Species Act of 1973); Sierra Club v. EPA, 322 F.3d 718, 728
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (allowing recovery of fees under the catalyst theory in an action brought
under the Clean Air Act). For a discussion of Buckhannon in the context of environmental
litigation, see, Marisa L. Ugalde, The Future of Environmental Citizen Suits After
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human
Resources, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 589 (2002).
190
See NAHMOD, supra note 14, § 10.10.
188
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Proposed Statute to Resestablish the Catalyst Theory

The OPEN Government Act of 2007 has already laid considerable
groundwork in reversing the effects of Buckhannon as the statute has been
interpreted by lower courts as reimplementing the pre-Buckhannon catalyst
theory.191 As a result, ensuring that new congressional statutes secure a
catalyst interpretation appears to be a relatively easy task. In fact, the easiest
way to secure widespread reinterpretation and ensure the use of the catalyst
theory for civil rights litigation is to amend 42 U.S.C. § 1988 against the
backdrop of the OPEN Government Act of 2007. For example, an effective
amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which draws upon the language of the
OPEN Government Act of 2007,192 as well as Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in
Buckhannon193 would be to add in the language:
For purposes of this section, a ‘prevailing party’ is: (1) a party
who has obtained relief through either a judicial order, or an
enforceable written agreement or consent decree; or (2) a
party whose pursuit of a nonfrivolous claim was the catalyst
for a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the
opposing party that provides the practical relief sought.
This language not only incorporates the successful OPEN Government Act
of 2007 language, but forecloses the possibility for a court to require a
showing of the complainant being provided the primary relief sought, as
opposed to the practical relief sought.194
1.

The Catalyst Theory: Primary Relief Sought v. Practical
Relief Sought

The Supreme Court has indicated that under the pre-Buckhannon catalyst
theory, the degree of the plaintiff’s success, in relation to the other goals of
the lawsuit, is a factor critical to determining the amount of a reasonable fee,
not the eligibility for a fee award.195 Instead, the Court reiterated the rule that
it previously enunciated in Hensley v. Eckerhart—the plaintiff does not need
to achieve the primary relief sought.196 Despite this, some federal and state
191

See supra Section IV.B.
OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 4(a), 121 Stat. 2524 (2007).
193
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S.
604, 622, 629 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
194
See Taylor v. Ft. Lauderdale, 810 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1987); Sullivan v. Pa. Dep’t of
Lab. & Indus., 663 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1981); Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458 (5th Cir.
1981); Waterman v. Farmer, 84 F. Supp. 2d 579 (D.N.J. 2000).
195
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 432 (1983).
196
Id. at 440.
192
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courts incorporated a test into the analysis of the catalyst theory which
requires that the plaintiff receive the primary relief sought.197
For example, California courts use the “primary relief sought” rule, after
retaining the catalyst theory post Buckhannon. California Code of Civil
Procedure § 1021.5 allows fees to a successful party “in any action which has
resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public
interest.”198 To be eligible for fees under this statute, California law does not
require a “judicially recognized change in the legal relationship between the
parties.”199 Instead, California allows attorney’s fees to be granted under the
“catalyst theory.”200 Under California law, the catalyst theory requires a
plaintiff to establish various elements, including that “the lawsuit was a
catalyst motivating the defendants to provide the primary relief sought.”201
To meet this element, “a plaintiff must establish the precise factual/legal
condition that [she] sought to change or affect.”202 The issue here is that
reimplementing the catalyst theory and requiring the primary factual or legal
condition sought, as California has, does not fully foreclose the potential of
selective mooting or strategic capitulation. However, by requiring the
practical relief sought under the catalyst theory, selective mooting poses a
relatively low risk for plaintiffs’ attorneys; even if plaintiffs do not win or
settle, the attorneys may recover their fees if the defendants make some
substantial or practical change based on the requested relief.203
One case in particular, Gordon v. Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc.,204 is a clear
indication of the issue in requiring the primary relief sought to be shown,
rather than allowing a showing of practical relief. In Gordon, the Ninth
Circuit held that the first element of California’s catalyst theory test205 was
not satisfied because the change in conduct by the defendant, Tootsie Roll,

197

Taylor, 810 F.2d at 1555–56; Sullivan, 663 F.2d at 449; Robinson, 652 F.2d at 465;
Waterman, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 583–84.
198
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1993).
199
Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los Angeles, 101 P.3d 174, 177 (Cal. 2004).
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 101 P.3d 140, 155 (Cal. 2004).
203
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S.
604, 634 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
204
Gordon v. Tootsie Roll Indus., 810 F. App’x 495 (9th Cir. 2020).
205
The test is: (1) “the lawsuit was a catalyst motivating the defendants to provide the
primary relief sought”; (2) the lawsuit had merit; and (3) the plaintiff attempted to settle the
claim prior to filing the lawsuit. Id. at 496 (quoting Tipton-Wittingham v. City of Los
Angeles, 101 P.3d 174, 177 (Cal. 2004)); accord Tipton-Wittingham, 101 P.3d at 177.
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did not give the plaintiff “the primary relief sought.”206 The plaintiff brought
a consumer action challenging alleged slack-fill in boxes of Junior Mints and
Sugar Babies.207 The plaintiff alleged that Tootsie Roll’s candy boxes were
misleading because of the amount of candy inside the package was
disproportionate to the size of the box.208 The plaintiff’s “theory of the case
was that the size of the box itself was misleading and that Tootsie Roll should
either ‘fill the Products’ box with more candy . . . or shrink the box to
accurately represent the amount of candy product therein.’”209 Additionally,
the plaintiff “expressly disclaimed” throughout the litigation that a change in
product labeling would remedy her grievances.210 Statements from the
plaintiff indicated that “net weight and serving disclosures [were] simply
irrelevant to the issue” and that adding additional information on the label
was a “red herring.”211 However, during litigation, Tootsie Roll did just that.
Tootsie Roll added the words “ACTUAL SIZE” to the front panel of the boxes
under the depiction of the candy contained inside, stated on the panel the
number of pieces inside, and moved several words from the back to the front
of the box.212 The court noted that these changes were sufficient to moot the
plaintiff’s claim without triggering a catalyst award because the plaintiff did
not seek relief in the form of a label change, but rather a box size change.213
Here, Gordon shows that under a primary relief sought test, it is still possible
to easily undercut the plaintiff’s claim without triggering a catalyst fees
award. Gordon also illustrates that under a primary relief sought test,
defendants faced with a claim for injunctive relief will explore changes that
are not precisely the relief the plaintiff is seeking, but may still render the
injunctive relief claim effectively moot.
D.

New Statute Applied to NYSR&PA

If Congress passed the proposed amendment to § 1988, detailed in Section
III.C of this Note, NYSR&PA would have reached a different outcome. The
amendment would define prevailing party as:
(1) a party who has obtained relief through either a judicial
order, or an enforceable written agreement or consent
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213

Gordon, 810 F. App’x at 496.
Id.
Id. at 497.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gordon, 810 F. App’x at 496–97.
Id.
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decree; or (2) a party whose pursuit of a nonfrivolous claim
was the catalyst for a voluntary or unilateral change in
position by the opposing party that provides the practical
relief sought.
Under this amendment, the government litigants might have predicted that
the petitioner would be considered a prevailing party as a result of their
change in conduct, and would have been more hesitant to voluntarily cease
the alleged unlawful conduct due to the threat of paying attorney’s fees.
Rather, the government litigants, who won at the trial level and on direct
appeal, would have placed their bets on winning at the Supreme Court.
However, without a definition of prevailing party, thus securing the use of
the catalyst theory, there is little to no financial risk of paying attorney’s fees.
Therefore, litigants such as New York City in NYSR&PA will not be deterred
from engaging in strategic capitulation. As a result, government defendants
may rather strategically moot a case than face a potentially disruptive
Supreme Court mandate. Therefore, potentially important public litigation
may come to frustratingly anticlimactic conclusions, as evinced in
NYSR&PA,214 because government defendants may seek to avoid creating
adverse precedent that will preclude desired policy ends. Thus, even if that
means losing a few battles to win the war, government defendants will
frequently seek to manufacture mootness to avoid creating an adverse
precedent,215 and evidence shows that government defendants have
frequently manufactured mootness, especially after Buckhannon dissolved
the catalyst theory. 216
For example, in NYSR&PA, the City’s gun law likely resembled a particular
policy goal of the City.217 Moreover, this policy goal in the form of a restrictive
gun law previously won substantively on the merits at both the district and

214

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526 (2020).
A prisoner filed a civil rights action challenging the denial of a kosher diet. See Guzzi
v. Thompson, 470 F. Supp. 2d 17, 19–20 (D. Mass. 2007). Here, Massachusetts succeeded in
mooting the case by giving only the plaintiff kosher meals and avoided the prospect of a
systemic change in policy. Id.
216
Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 20, at 1112 & n.140 (collecting cases); see, e.g., Dow,
supra note 140, at 675 & n.238–46 (collecting cases); Ashton, supra note 131, at 969 (“[T]he
voluntary cessation exception most likely will not be applied to government
defendants . . . .”).
217
The gun law refered to here is the original ordinance that prohibited law-abiding New
Yorkers with a license to keep a handgun in the home (a “premises license”) from taking that
weapon to a firing range outside the City. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York,
140 S. Ct. 1525, 1530 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
215
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circuit level.218 Thus, the City would have been more likely to litigate the
merits of the issue on certiorari, rather than voluntarily change its desired
policy ends without judicial direction to do so. Additionally, the City would
have been more likely to litigate on the merits, not only to potentially avoid
a required change in law, but to avoid paying attorney’s fees if not required
to do so. Rather, after Buckhannon and without the catalyst theory, it
encouraged and incentivized the government defendant in NYSR&PA to
voluntarily moot its opponent’s claim.
Indeed, after a grant of certiorari, the City faced an inevitable ruling on the
merits of its gun law and potential decree formally requiring the City to
change its desired policy ends. If the Supreme Court, after ruling on the
merits, found for the plaintiff, the City would have been required to change
its law per the Court's direction and pay attorney’s fees. However, if the City
could mildly change its law at its own discretion without guidance from the
Court, and avoid paying attorney’s fees while doing so, it is clear which
outcome the City would pick. Further, not only is there a financial incentive
for the City to moot its opponent’s case, and avoid paying attorney’s fees, but
also a policy incentive. That is, the City could change the law mildly enough
to moot the case before the Court requires the City’s desired policy-ends to
change even further than the government defendant would have outside of a
ruling on the merits. By choosing to selectively moot this concerning case,
the City chose to willingly lose the battle to win the war.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the City chose to implement a mild
change in the law rather than litigate the issue on the merits. What is
surprising, however, is despite an indication that the voluntary cessation
doctrine would be applied to stop the case from falling under the
jurisdictional bar of mootness,219 the Court wholly dodged the application of
the doctrine. Thus, while the Court in Buckhannon concluded that the
voluntary cessation doctrine would replace the catalyst theory and deter
strategic capitulation, NYSR&PA stands as empirical evidence of: (1) the
unpredictable use of the voluntary cessation doctrine as applied to
government defendants, and (2) the doctrine’s inability to truly deter
strategic capitulation post Buckhannon.
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See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 86 F. Supp. 3d 249, 268
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2018).
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Davis & Reaves, supra note 21, at 340 (discussing how the facts of NYSR&PA
implicate application of the voluntary cessation doctrine).

306

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:2

V. CONCLUSION
The Buckhannon decision to dissolve the catalyst theory has drawn
considerable criticism. In dissolving the catalyst theory, the Court dismissed
concerns that the threat of strategic capitulation may disincentivize future
plaintiffs from bringing suit with meritorious, but expensive, claims. Critics
were right to fear that the Court’s decision would pose a severe risk to civil
rights enforcement by imposing a substantial obstacle to obtaining attorney’s
fees, and that without the prospect of attorney’s fees, many civil rights claims
would lack the financial incentives sufficient to interest private attorneys.
However, finding these concerns to be speculative and unsupported by any
empirical evidence, the Court dismantled the theory by concluding that a
defendant’s strategic capitulation lacks sufficient judicial imprimatur to
render a litigant a prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees.
Although the Court provided various reasons for dismantling the catalyst
theory, the Court not only noted that there was a lack of empirical evidence
of strategic capitulation posing a risk to litigants without the catalyst theory,
but that the voluntary cessation exception to the mootness doctrine would
provide sufficient protection for plaintiffs from insincere changes in
behavior. Since Buckhannon, however, empirical evidence has shown that
public interest cases, such as injunctive relief against government actors (in
which attorney’s fees have been historically deemed an essential remedy),
have been severely affected by the Court’s decision in Buckhannon.
Moreover, evidence shows that government defendants are frequently
granted special solicitude in the voluntary cessation analysis, which indicates
the exception’s inability to truly dissuade a defendant’s insincere change in
behavior.
The solution to the inability of the voluntary cessation doctrine to deter
strategic capitulation is to reimplement the catalyst theory. Scholars have
called for the Supreme Court to reimplement the catalyst theory by
overruling, or reexamining Buckhannon. With that said, the “special force”
attached to statutory stare decisis, combined with widespread reliance on
Buckhannon, makes reversing Buckhannon highly unlikely. Congressional
response to Buckhannon is a hopeful alternative to reimplement the catalyst
theory. Instead of forcing prospective civil rights plaintiffs to fight a taxing
and unpredictable battle of mootness without the deterrent of the catalyst
theory, a new statute defining “prevailing party” can deter strategic
capitulation, circumvent the mootness debate, promote civil rights
enforcement, and encourage judicial review of important issues, rather than
settling for the review of mild, insincere issues of law.

